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PUBLIC FINANCING OF CAMPAIGNS 
Introduction 
It is impossible to understand campaign finance reform and public 
. . 
financing of campaigns without considering each of the components included 
in comprehensive reform proposals; namely: Disclosure of campaign finances, 
limitations on contributions, limitations on expenditures, and public sub-
sidies for campaign expenses. Advocates of reform feel that these components 
are so intertwined that none by itself can achieve much meaningful reform. 
For example; California adopted disciosure requirements in the Political 
Reform Act of 1974, but there are indications of public awarenes~ that 
disclosure is only a first step toward reform. 
On January 2, 1976, Common Cause released the results of a poll 
conducted by Field Research Corporation. In answer to the question: "Would 
you favor or oppose a California election law which would impose strict 
limits on what a candidate may collect and spend and which would finance 
campaigns by matching small private contributions with public funding?", 
69.6% of the respondents favored such a law. 
Assemblyman Howard Berman queried his constituents in August 1975, and 
found those responding to be 2 to 1 in favor of publicly funded campaign 
subsidies coupled with limitations on contributions and expenditures. 
Such signs of support for public subsidies in California and the recent 
holdings of the u. s. Supreme CoUrt in Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976) 
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concerning the federal campaign reform statutes make this a propitious 
time to review the issues involved. 
Goals of Campaign Financing Reform 
The most commonly perceived problem with the current campaign system is 
that the entire system has become skewed, so that, regardless of personal 
intent, most participants are trapped and must either comply with the system 
or run the serious risk of political impotence within it. 
The electoral process is ideally viewed as a marketplace of ideas 
competing for voter approval, but because of the bias of the process some 
ideas may never be adequately presented to the electorate and, therefore, 
voters are denied choices which they should be allowed to make. 
Recognizing their limited choices, many voters have refused to part-
icipate in the electoral process· or have otherwise indicated an alienation 
from the governmental system. (For example, in the 1974 California guber-
·natorial election, almost 6.3 million votes were cast; it is estimated that 
another 7 ~llion citizen adults in this state either were not registered 
or were registered but failed to vote -- see The California Poll, Release No. 
846, 1/3/75. The title of Release No. 858 of the same organization, 5/29/75, 
speaks for itself: "Public Confidence In Institt .. ~ions.Continues to Decline.") 
Although flaws in the electoral system are difficult to quantify, one 
indicator can be measured: money. Campaigns are expensive and, therefore, 
only those candidates with access to money can participate effectively. 
The pursuit of campaign funds is a major cause of the system's imbalance. 
Given the constraints of time, those seeking money are most likely to solicit 
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groups or individuals who have larger sums of money at their command. 
Certain categories of ideas have traditionally lacked much monetary support. 
Soliciting large donations for the sake of efficiency leaves both under-
financed groups and the mass of the electorate unrepresented at a crucial 
stage of the electoral process. 
Present fund-raising methods have other inherent problems: politicians 
often find raising money to be both a demeaning and inordinately time-
consuming endeavor and there can be at least an implicit ~pro~ 
~nvolved in giving and receiving large sums. 
If the sole alternative to such money brokering were individual candidate 
wealth, then many potentially viable candidates and the ideas they espouse 
would never be able to enter the marketplace of ideas. 
In summary, advocates of publicly subsidized elections have articulated 
several complementary goals which mandate the 'use of subsidies: 
1) To insure a vigorous and reasonably broad competition of 
candidates and ideas during the electoral process; 
2) to alleviate the reliance on "big givers" for campaign 
funding; 
3) to increase citizen participation in campaigns, e.g., 
greater volume of small donations or more emphasis 
on campaign volunteers. 
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Components of Reform 
(I) Disclosure 
Campaign financial disclosure requirements are the cornerstone of 
reform efforts; California adopted a disclosure law in the Political 
Reform Act of 1974. 
An attraction of disclosure has been the hope that it would make 
campaign reform self-policing; information filed in a central accessible 
location could be perused by political opponents and by the media who 
could publicize any apparent questionable source or use of funds. 
Most people believe that reasonable disclosure requirements do not 
have undue negative impact on the electoral process, however, some critics 
suggest that disclosure is too time-consuming and that it deters some 
candidates or their staffs from the political arena. 
The u. S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo held the analogous federal 
disclosure statutes to be constitutional. The Court did factor out the 
truly independent actor who tries to influence an election but who neither 
acts on behalf of a particular candidate nor expends funds in an effort 
expressly calling for the defeat or election of a clearly identified 
candidate. The federal statute was found to be inapplicable to that kind 
of activity. (The independent actor, whether an individual or a group, will 
be discussed further with regard to limitations on contributions and 
expenditures; the Buckley court defined truly independent activity differently 
in the limitations area.) 
However, even though disclosure has its positive attributes, it is 
not the panacea which some had hoped it would be. As Senator Gregorio has 
pointed out: 
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••• (D)isclosure of campaign contributions is necessary 
and beneficial • • • it will deter some of the worst abuses 
••• The problem is, however, that the vast bulk of campaign 
·contributions will go unscrutinized. Neither the press nor 
·the public has the time or patience to sift through the massive 
quantities of campaign reporting data generated by a single 
election. Nor does either have the time to try to make some 
sense out of that data - except, perhaps, with respect to a 
few very salient issues of widespread public interest • • • 
Special interests will still be able to purchase access to 
public officials and to secure special attention for any 
number of low-visibility issues which, when take~ together, 
far outweigh in importance the few glamorous issues that do 
come to light. ("Background information on SB 442" -- April 
1975, pp. 3-4, issued by Senator Gregorio's office.) 
If the campaign system is fundamentally skewed, then disclosure will 
not provide "a choice between clean-money qandidates and dirty-money 
candidates; all are soiled." (Political Money by Adamany and Agree, pp. 
3-4; see suggestions for further reading.) 
(II) Limitations on Contributions 
Imposing limitations on contributions to candidates by either individuals 
or groups and requiring contributions o,ver a certain amount to ·be conveyed by 
a written, signed instrument is intended to prevent the possibility of purchased 
influence and to induce all candidates to seek a broader base among many small 
sum donors. 
While there are decisions to be made regarding the kinds of contributions 
to be so limited and the limits themselves, the toughest issue of this 
component of.reform is llowrtR treat groups and associations: 
.,!; ... 
Drafters of California bills will have to decide whether 
a corporation should be considered a group or a person. 
If a corporation is defined as a group, should it be 
limited to one contribution to each candidate, or should 
the corporate division, affiliates and subsidi~ries also 
each be allowed.to contribute? 
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Labor unions present similar problems. Should a county 
labor council be enjoined from contributing to a specific 
campaign if the statewide labor federation also contributes? 
Similarly, should a union local be p+eemP,ted from contribut-
ing to a candiqate if the statewide parent union has 
previously contributed? 
("Public Funding of Political Campaigns: Attitudes and 
Issues in California," Fay and Leatherwood, February 1975, 
p. 4; see suggestions for further reading.) 
The Buckley opinion did uphold the constitutionality of the federal 
limitations on contributions. However, several policy issues remain. For 
example, since the independent actor can choose to expend funds independently 
rather than contribute directly and since various multiple committees may 
be organized, each carrying its own limit, there is some doubt as to whether 
effective limitations can be enforced. (For purposes of distinguishing 
between independent expenditures and contributions, the Buckley criteria are: 
authorization, consent or cooperation of the candidates' campaign effort. 
If those factors are absent, there exists an independent expenditure even 
if it is used to voice support for a specified candidate.) 
There has also been discussion of the importance.of the original "seed" 
money for getting campaign efforts underway in the first place. Depending 
upon at what stage contribution limitations are imposed, e.g., one year or 
six months prior to filing or only after filing, potentially viable candidates 
without ready-name identification or personal wealth may be hard-pressed to 
build momentum by collecting small contributions • 
.. 
(III) Limitations on Expenditures 
The Buckley court found the unilateral imposition of limitations on the 
level of campaign expenditures to be unconstitutional - with the use of a 
candidate's personal funds and the spending by a truly independent actor 
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(acting without authorization, consent or cooperation) held to be expenditures, 
not contributions. 
However, voluntary contractual agreements by a candidate to limit spending 
as a condition of accepting public subsidies is permissible. The staff of 
the Fair Political Practices Commission also feels that the Buckley opinion 
does not necessarily prohibit limitations on expenditures by corporations 
and labor unions. (Discussed under item No. 39, part (2), proposals to amend 
the Political Reform Act: preliminary recommendations by the staff of the 
FPPC, February 10, 1976.) 
Limiting the level of campaign expenditures has been proposed as a method 
of insuring balanced campaign dialogue and as another means of preventing 
dependence on large contributions - since there would theoretically be less 
impetus for seeking larger sums. There are also general claims that current 
campaigns often cost too much. 
The problems involved in implementing limitations include those of 
definition and supervision, especially concerning activities of independent 
actors who would not be affected by a candidate's contractual self-restraint, 
and the actual.dollar limits to use. If the limits are too low, then new 
personalities will confront difficulties in achieving recognition and a 
premium will be placed on prior public exposure in other fields, e.g., 
sports or entertainment. If they 'are too high, then the limits become meaning-
• 
less and should be revealed as such. 
Incumbency advantage is another problem. Lower limits favor incumbents, 
who re~eive a certain amount of public exposure simply by virtue of .their 
office - at public expense. A solution is some kind of proportional limits, 
with· .. challengers allowed to spend a gi.ven percent more than incumbents. 
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(IV) Public Campaign Subsidies 
Public election subsidies complement provisions for disclosure and 
contribution limitations, both of which tend to curtail private funding. 
Only subsidies would serve to assure broader access to the campaign arena 
and subsidies are the indispensible inducement for voluntary limits on 
campaign spending. However, th~ topic of public subsidies also raises 
complex problems of both policy and implementation. 
The following questions demonstrate some of the difficulties involved 
in formulating any subsidy plan: 
1) Should public subsidies be available for both primary and 
general elections? 
2) Should subsidies be used as a floor to provide a basic 
level of participation for each candidate, allowing for 
the use of private funds too, or should the entire expense 
of a campaign be publicly underwritten, with strictures 
imposed on the use of private funds? If the latter scheme 
is chosen, what should be done with private funds collected 
and, more-importantly, what would be the effect of opportunities 
for independent actors to spend outside of those strictures? 
3) If only a floor is provided, should any limitations on 
expenditures be imposed? 
4) How should subsidies be disbursed - funds delivered to 
candidates? bill paid by the government? media coverage/ 
time provided by the state? other services-in-kind made 
available? or some combination of methods? 
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5) If subsidies were available for primaries, what threshholds 
could_ be used to screen out frivolous arid solely self--
servifig candidates? Access to subsidies could be predicted 
on both funds collected, maybe requiring a minimum total 
and a minimum number of small donations and signatures 
obtained on petitions or cards. 
6) . What role, if any, should parties serve in public subsidy 
plans? 
7) Should each candidate receive the same subsidy or should 
a proportional _allocation be designed to provide funds 
relative to public support or possibly to discount the 
share of an incumbent seeking reelection? If a proportional 
sy~tem is used, how can public support be measured -- by· 
past party vote performance? by money raised or signatures 
collected? or possibly by a voucher system, allowing voters 
to give state distributed vouchers to candidates who could 
redeem them for state funds? 
8) What effect would subsidies have on minor party or independent 
candidates and how would they share in subsidies? - • 
9) What would subsidies cost and where would the money come 
from -- general funds? a tax check-off system similar to 
the federal presidential plan? a new tax surcharge? 
10) What state agency would supervise a subsidy plan? California 
proposals usually name the Fair Poli~aal Practices Commission 
(FPPC) , but is that presently feasible given current staffing 
and workload requirements? . How large an agency would be 
necessary? 
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The complexity of this component of campaign reform means that the 
implementation of subsidies is a problem not suited to easy oi simple 
resolution. 
Analysis of Some Recent Proposals 
Each proposal would apply to statewide and legislative elections and 
each names the FPPC as the general supervisory agency; no subsidy plan 
would allow unopposed candidates to receive public funds. 
SB 442 - Beilenson 
Provided for reimbursement of candidates in general and runoff elections 
for qualified expenses at a rate of $2 in public funds for each $1 received 
in private contributions; formulas were included to determine the maximum 
amount available in public funds but no overall limits on spending were 
included. 
Limited the use of a candidate's personal funds and the receipt of 
contributions from any individual or group, including labor unions and corpora-
tions to $100. 
No private contributions received prior to the day of a primary election 
could be used by a candidate to pay for general or runoff election expenses 
(with a speci~ic $1000 exception). 
Limited independent committees to $1000 in expenditures and to the 
receipt of $100 contributions only from individuals who had not previously 
given $100 on behalf of the same candidate. 
1llowed enforcement by the!Attorney General and by private residents who 
could recover treble damages, measured by unlawful contributions or expenditures, 
plus attorneys' fees. 
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Included a statement of qualifications and political philosophy submitted 
by each candidate in the ballot pamphlet. 
Status: Died on inactive file. 
AB 2564 - Berman 
Provided partial funding for candidates in primary and special elections 
with limited funds available to those who qualify exclusively or by a combina-
' 
tion of endorsement cards and private contributions; threshhold minimums 
determined by formulas involving total registered voters with allocation by 
a matching plan in a 3 to 1 ratio of public funds to demonstrated support. 
Provided partial funding of general and runoff elections for candidates 
who qualify for the ballot. Maximum public funding limits set at a percentage 
of limitations imposed on total expenditures. Allocation would be by a set. 
amount augmented by a matching plan. 
Included a statement by candidates in ballot pamphlet mailings. Either 
the Secretary of State or County Clerk -- for statewide and legislative offices, 
respectiyely -- would be required to refuse to print anything obscene or 
otherwise proscribed. 
Imposed limitations on contributions by individuals and groups with same 
dollar limit applicable to both. 
Sets limits on total expenditures for each office, applicable to candidates 
and independent actors; limits for incumbents set at 10% less than for other 
candidates. ~ 
Allowed party committees to make a limited aggregate contribution to 
candidates and to make a limited aggregate expenditure to further a candidate's 
election. 
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Status: Died in Committee. SB 1414 (Rains) was introduced January 13, 
1976 as a Senate companion bill to AB 2564. Its future is currently unclear. 
Certain provisions are obviously inconsistent with Buckley v. Valeo. 
AB 2942 - Goggin 
Gives candidates in general and runoff elections an option to financa 
their campaigns solely with public funds; those exercising that option would 
be required to contract with the FPPC not to collect or expend any private 
contributions during that campaign. 
Major party, minor party and independent candidates would receive a total 
amount based upon given formulas. 
Creates a State Campaign Finance Fund to be managed by the FPPC. 
Defines political advertising and requires that any person or group 
publishing such advertising first file a confidential form with the FPPC 
which would include specified information concerning that ad. The cost of 
any ads promoting candidates who had opted for public funds would be debited 
against their total public allocation 
over the publication of the ad. 
even if the candidate had no control 
Status: Introduced February 2, 1976; referred to Committee on Elections 
and Reapportionment. 
Common Cause Initiative 
Limits allowable contributions by any person to any candidate or person 
{with person defined to include individuals or groups); larger groups could 
give a somewhat greater sum and the limits are generally higher for all 
contributions given prior to the time a candidate files or becomes eligible 
for public funds. Parties also contribute aggregate total sums. 
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Limits expenditures for those candidates who choose to accept public 
funds -- with an incumbent limitation differentiaL 
A candidate's statement would be mailed with the appropriate ballot 
pamphlet in all elections; the statement would not be edited or reviewed 
by any public official. 
Limited public funding on a matching basis would be available for 
candidates in primary elections who met minimum threshhold support require-
ments as demonstrated by dollars contributed or by signed endorsement 
cards (which would be confidential and would contain a statement declaring 
that confidentiality). 
Limited public funding would be available· for candidates in general, 
special and runoff elections, with allocation based on set amounts augmented 
by matching funds. 
A matchable contribution would be one made by written instrument containing 
the name of the donor. 
Status: Filed as an initiative in February 1976; the Common Cause 
directors have subsequently decided to wa~t until at least 1978 before 
pursuing the initiative route to implement further campaign financing reform • 
• 
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